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Abstract
The use of machine learning (ML) has become
an established practice in the realm of malware
classification and other areas within cybersecurity.
Characteristic of the contemporary realm of intelligent
malware classification is the threat of adversarial
ML. Adversaries are looking to target the underlying
data and/or models responsible for the functionality of
malware classification to map its behavior or corrupt
its functionality. The ends of such adversaries are
bypassing the cybersecurity measures and increasing
malware effectiveness. We develop an adversarial
training based ML approach for malware classification
under adversarial conditions that leverages a stacking
ensemble method, which compares the performance
of 10 base ML models when adversarially trained on
three data sets of varying data perturbation schemes.
This comparison ultimately reveals the best performing
model per data set, which includes random forest,
bagging and gradient boosting. Experimentation also
includes stacking a mixture of ML models in both the
first and second levels in the stack. A first level stack
across all 10 ML models with a second level support
vector machine is top performing. Overall, this work
reveals that a malware classifier can be developed to
account for potential forms of training data perturbation
with minimal effect on performance.

1.

Introduction

Machine learning (ML) capabilities have recently
been shown to offer astounding ability to automatically
analyze and classify large amounts of data in complex
scenarios, in many cases matching or surpassing human
capabilities. Furthermore, ML is at the forefront of the
application of artificial intelligence (AI) to the realm of
cybersecurity. While the contemporary cyber domain
has become characterized by a reliance on big data and
a widespread prevalence of threats, so has the need for
increased automation with regards to applying ML for
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active cyber defense.
Malware, or malicious software, is any program
or file that is harmful to a computer user. Malware
can perform a variety of functions such as stealing,
encrypting or deleting sensitive data, altering or
hijacking core computing functions, and monitoring
users’ computer activity without permission. Malware
are intended to gain access to computer systems and
network resources, disturb computer operations, and
gather personal information without taking the consent
of system’s owner. Malwares come in wide range
of variations like Virus, Worm, Trojan-horse, Rootkit,
Backdoor, Botnet, Spyware, Adware, etc., and a
particular malware may reveal the characteristics of
multiple classes at the same time [1].
Malware classification is the task of determining the
class of a sample that has previously been identified as
malware. The use of ML for malware classification
offers a solution to the diminishing feasibility of
classification without automation. ML can effectively
classify programs/files as malicious with a high degree
of accuracy, thus increasing the level of security and
the ability of network administrators to more effectively
monitor their systems and computers on the network.
Such a fact explains the applicability and effectiveness
of using ML for classifying malware. Gandotra et
al. [1] provides a survey of the various ML approach
that have been proposed for detecting and classifying
unknown samples into either known malware families
or underline those samples that exhibit unseen behavior,
for detailed analysis. Narayanan et al. [2] use several
ML classification techniques (artificial neural network,
k-nearest neighbors, and support vector machine) for
the identification of malware data into their respective
classes, whereas Liu et al. [3] use a clustering algorithm
to discover new malware families as part of a ML-based
malware analysis system. Others have expanded upon
the traditional ML approaches using deep learning
techniques. For example, Kalash et al. [4] propose a
deep learning framework for malware classification that
leverage convolutional neural networks by converting
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malware binaries to grayscale images for training.
Additionally, Cakir & Dogdu [5] used a shallow deep
learning-based feature extraction method to represent
any given malware based on its opcodes, and then
gradient boosting was used for the classification task.
The design of these malware classifiers, however,
is ultimately flawed and features key vulnerabilities
that adversaries may exploit in order to diminish the
classifier’s effectiveness.
For example, Grosse et
al. [6] demonstrate how to construct highly-effective
adversarial sample crafting attacks for neural networks
used as malware classifiers. In general, ML models have
been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial manipulation
through systematic modification of features known as
adversarial examples. These adversarial manipulations
are also referred to as adversarial ML attacks [7]. When
evaluating the susceptibility of a system to adversarial
ML attacks, an important consideration is attacker
knowledge of the targeted AI system [8]. The ability
of the adversary to interact with components of the AI
system or inspect its operation greatly influences the
type of attacks that can be reasonably employed.
The first type of access is known as the ‘white
box’ paradigm. With this type of access, the adversary
has complete knowledge of the AI implementation
internal state, including the software, data, weights, and
input and output values. Armed with this knowledge,
an adversary would be able to devise and mount a
highly specific attack against the AI system. In the
‘black box’ paradigm, the adversary has no access to
internal information of the AI system, but is able to
repeatedly probe with input/output pairs to infer the
inner state. While a black box implementation limits
internal investigation, the property of transferability
would permit an adversary to construct a proxy model
of the targeted system that replicates the input/output
pairings of the original. An accurate proxy will also
support surrogate white box analysis. The last access
type is known as the ‘hidden box’ paradigm. In this
paradigm, the adversary must make assumptions about
the AI model, including its existence (revealed perhaps
through overall system behavior) and had no access to
the direct system output. The hidden box paradigm is
often encountered in cybersecurity applications.
Given these adversarial ML access paradigms,
adversarial ML attacks often take three forms: a)
poisoning attacks inject incorrectly or maliciously
labeled data points into the training set so that
the algorithm learns the wrong mapping (degrading
prediction quality or intentionally misguide predictions
altogether); 2) evasion attacks perturb correctly
classified input samples just enough to cause errors
in classification (misclassifying malicious behavior as

benign); and 3) model inversion which repeatedly test
the trained algorithm with edge-case inputs in order
to reveal the previously hidden decision boundaries
(inferring information about the original training data
used to train the targeted model which can pose a
potential information privacy risk) [9, 10].
In the first category, a poisoning attack pollutes the
training data to skew model behavior. Adversarial data
is fed into a model during training to shift the decision
boundary in the attacker’s favor. This type of attack
is common in systems that must rely on observations
in the operational domain for its training data. For
example, AI spam detectors trained on this adversarial
user feedback would incorrectly classify some types of
spam emails as “non-spam” [11]. Strong data security,
chain of custody, and tamper verification procedures
are important to ensure the data used to develop ML
models is free from adversarial influence. This may
be unexpectedly difficult to prove due to the prevalence
of transfer learning in the AI community, in which
pre-trained algorithms are reused across domains.
The second category, evasion attack, is the most
common adversarial ML use case. In an evasion
attack, inputs are engineered to cause classifiers to
assign the input to an erroneous class. The most
threatening evasion attacks utilize adversarial inputs
that are imperceptible to casual human observers and
resistant to pre-algorithm data conditioning. In a classic
academic example, a picture of a panda was blended
with scaled noise and fed into a pre-trained image
classifier. The classifier incorrectly assigned the panda
image to the “gibbon” class because of changes the
additive noise caused to the image in the algorithm
feature space [12]. Due in part to the prevalence and
maturity of adversarial input tools, evasion attacks are
a potential threat anytime computer vision and natural
language processing are employed in AI systems.
The third category, model inversion, is the least
publicized attack category and most difficult to
execute, but carries serious privacy and data security
implications. In a model inversion attack, an attacker
repeatedly probes the AI system to extract information
about the model configuration or embedded training
data. For example, researchers were able to passably
recreate an image used to train a classifier by
systematically probing the model and observing the
available output [13]. This category of attack is
applicable only to the black box access paradigm but is
especially viable when no limits are set on the number
of AI system queries and when the system produces
weighted results in place of binary decisions. Training
data privacy is especially important when the data
involved are sensitive or strictly regulated.
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For the malware classification task, the ML model
extracts features from the programs/files to classify it
as some identified type of malware. Most of these
ML models are integrated into an antivirus software,
making it difficult for malware authors (i.e., adversaries)
to know which classifier a malware classification system
uses and the underlying parameters of the classifier.
However, because ML models for malware classification
rely on a pool of training data in order to shape its
predictions, this data serves as a target for potential
adversaries seeking to exploit. For example, these
adversaries can figure out what features a malware
classifier uses and can manually modify them, for
example, by changing some application programming
interface (API) names in the import directory table
[9]. In poisoning the data that these classifiers draw
upon to shape its predictions, adversaries can lower the
accuracy of these classifiers, or even alter the range
of acceptable data, thus facilitating the obscuration of
potential malware [14].
These adversarial ML attacks in the cyber domain
can cause the models to misbehave or reveal information
about their inner workings, which poses significant
cyber risk that needs to be managed [15]. If ML-based
AI systems are to succeed in helping cybersecurity, they
must be secure and robust to adversarial attacks. In
order to protect against the threat of these adversarial
ML attacks, many proactive defense strategies have been
developed to serve as countermeasures for adversarial
examples. These proactive strategies can make ML
models within the cybersecurity domain more robust.
One such proactive strategy is known as adversarial
training, which entails training classification models
with adversarial examples to make the ML model more
robust. These adversarial examples must be generated
and injected into the training data set [9]. While
there are many different approaches for generating
adversarial examples, small perturbations are commonly
used in practice. Note that adversarial examples should
be designed to be close to the original samples and
imperceptible to a human, which causes performance
degradation of ML models compared to that of a human.

1.1.

Related Literature

AI systems have even become essential to big data
analytics and data mining. However, its widespread use
has led to the identification of various vulnerabilities and
its identification by Yu [16] as a major privacy concern.
Such vulnerabilities are in part due to the emergence of
the adversarial environment. Biggio et al. [17] point the
overall design of such systems as the major flaw. The
concept of the adversarial environment characterizes

the current challenges facing ML-based classification
models as they are subject to attacks to degrade
their validity and effectiveness. Lowd & Meek [18]
describe this condition as they introduce the Adversarial
Classifier Reverse Engineering problem which describes
the adversary’s approach to learning about a malware
classifier. Huang et al. [19] would complement Lowd &
Meek [18] with their own application of these principles
to their concept of adversarial ML. Huang et al. [19]
apply a game-theoretic approach to the adversarial
learning problem, an approach in which the adversary is
actively attempting to determine strategy of the classifier
in order to increase the effectiveness of malware attacks.
Khurana et al. [20] offer an analysis of such attacks
in the contemporary adversarial learning environment
as they describe an approach to combating poisoning
attacks.
Such attacks involve the poisoning of
open-source intelligence data sources with instances
designed to produce false positives/negatives by threat
defense systems. The concept of the poisoning attack
is more specifically the subject of the online centroid
detection. According to Kloft & Laskov [21], poisoning
attacks attempt to target the centroid and radius of the
area of classifier’s range of legitimate classifications.
With the introduction of malicious training points, an
adversary can force the centroid to shift in the direction
of the attack. Doing so can allow new attacks to
fall within the range of what the classifier considers
legitimate data. Barreno et al. [22] define the adversarial
model with their concept of the attack model, which
looks to classify adversarial attacks based on influence,
specificity, and security violation of the attack.

1.2.

Research Motivation

This work responds to the need for malware
classification that can operate effectively within
the emerging adversarial environment. While the
development of ML models has been the subject of
established research, the motivation is for practical
approaches to adversarial training and subsequent
evaluation of such classifiers. The underlying aim is
thus the development for processes of experimentally
developing and testing malware classification models by
leveraging an adversarial training based ML approach.
The concept is that adversarial training can help
decrease a classifications model’s susceptibility to
adversarial ML such as evasion attacks. Such attacks
are the mechanism behind which adversaries alter a
ML model’s range of acceptability during inference. In
achieving this end result, the notable secondary result is
an effective, practical method by which models can be
experimentally trained and evaluated for effectiveness.
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2.

Materials and Methods

In an effort to integrate adversarial training into
the ML approach for malware classification, this work
leverages a stacking ensemble method as a means
of building a classification model under adversarial
conditions. This approach begins with a comparison of
the performance of 10 base classification models when
adversarially trained on three data sets of varying data
perturbation schemes. This comparison determines the
best performing model per data set. In stacking the top
performing models in terms of accuracy, this work looks
to reveal that a ML model can be developed to account
for potential forms of training data perturbation with
minimal effect on the overall model performance.

2.1.

Attack Model

In order to achieve the goal of assessing and
analyzing malware classification model performance
within an adversarial environment, this work considers
adversarial training as a strategy to proactively defend
against adversarial evasion attacks.
The conduct
of adversarial training involves the generation and
injection of adversarial examples into the data set
used to train ML models.
Thus, this generated
adversarial environment is modeled off of the random
or indiscriminate data poisoning attack model. This
attack model looks to disrupt a classifier’s accuracy by
randomly perturbing the input data in order to disrupt
the training data and ultimately the integrity of the
classifier [23]. Specifically, this work models a random
perturbation of input data and labels in order to produce
a misclassification effect on the classifier.
This attack model is ultimately aligned with our
research goals and objectives in that its purpose to define
the abstract method in which the adversarial examples
are generated, for the sake of analyzing classifier
performance under certain adversarial conditions. The
attack model is not necessarily meant to directly mimic
the full scope of a red-team style attack on the classifier.
The scope of the attack model is important to note in this
regard. An attack of this nature features a high degree of
difficulty to carry out. Because this work is concerned
more with ML system security with regards to the direct
performance of the classifier, the technical aspects of the
adversary’s access to the data will be considered but not
treated as part of the scope of the attack model. The
scope will ultimately consist of the data perturbation
scheme and the corresponding intentional poisoning of
the training data, training the malware classifier on the
poisoned data, and interpreting classifier output.

2.2.

Data Understanding

The modeling for this work is based on a training
data set of 12,536 samples previously identified as
malware; the data were obtained from the Association
for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)
2019 Workshop on Artificial Intelligence for Cyber
Security (AICS) challenge problem. Particularly, the
samples were identified by a class corresponding to
its malware type, and the set of malware types used
for this data set consist of Viruses, Worms, Packed
Malware, Trojan Horse, and AdWare. For each sample,
a dynamic analysis on a Windows virtual machine was
performed and the sequence of Windows API calls was
extracted. In the data, the class labels and API calls are
obfuscated as integers, but the correspondence between
any particular API call as a unigram and as part of a
bigram or trigram is preserved. Assumptions about the
data are that all instances are malware, the classes cover
all instances under consideration, and each instance
has a single unambiguous label. The data set is in the
form of an N xM matrix in JavaScript Object Notation
(JSON) format and consists of six fields: “data”,
“row index”,“column index”,“col schema”,“shape”,
and “labels.” More specifically, the data schema take on
the following field, data types, and ranges:
data : int [1:6317199]
row index : int [1:6317199]
column index: int [1:6317199]
col schema : chr [1:106428]
shape : int [1:2]
labels : int [1:12536]
Among the fields present in the JSON file,
“data”, “row index”, and “column index” correspond
to the contents of the feature matrix used to
train ML classifiers. Specifically, the “data” field
gives the values of the nonzero entries of the
feature matrix, while “row index”, and “column index”
give the row and column indices corresponding to
these values. Thus, the feature matrix represents
the instance, i, that corresponds to the input,
[row index[i], column index[i]]. As such, a particular
nonzero entry in the “data” field is represented by the
following function, for i = 1, ..., K:
f eature matrix[row index[i], column index[i]] = data[i]

(1)

The contents of the “col schema” array take on
the form of either unigrams, bigrams, or trigrams of
Windows API calls. The array provides names for the
columns of the feature matrix. For unigrams, a column
name is a distinct integer corresponding to that specific
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API call, for bigrams (and trigrams), the column name
is a pair (triple) of integers separated by a semicolon.
For example, the trigram “27;9;150” represents the
sequence of API calls 27, 9, and 150. The “shape”
array corresponds to the [N, M ] values that dictate the
dimensions of the feature matrix. Finally, the “labels”
array corresponds to the class of each instance within
the feature matrix. Example values of the label are 0,
1, 2, 3, and 4, which map to each of the malware types
(i.e., five classes). This schema is unique to the training
data as it is used to assess classification performance.

2.3.

inputs and a perturbed set of labels, respectively (i.e.,
data poisoning attack model). More specifically, the
classification models are each adversarially trained on
three separate data sets and are assessed based on a
constant set-aside validation data set containing inputs
and the corresponding labels that are pulled from the
initial base data set. A comparison of the three data sets
used for adversarial training is depicted in Figure 1 and
is further explained below to highlight the differences.

Data Preparation

Preparing the data for modeling, experimentation
and analysis involved first iterating through the range
of the “data” schema according to the function defined
in Equation (1). At this point the feature matrix was
converted to compressed sparse row (CSR) format and
saved to a npz file. Furthermore, this initial CSR format
of the data was normalized with scaling from -1 to 1 and
a fixed standard deviation.
While the described technique provided a feature
matrix that could be used to train ML models, the shape
of this initial matrix (12536, 6317199) posed an issue
of dimensionality. High-dimensional data in general
is an issue based on in increased need in the number
of samples necessary for a estimator to effectively
generalize. Furthermore, in reducing the dimensions,
the data can be analyzed and used for training
classifiers despite limitations to memory and processing
power. For the purpose of this work, responding
to the problem of high-dimensionality involved an
implementation of singular value decomposition (SVD)
on the feature matrix. This SVD technique is the
equivalent to Principle Components Analysis in which
the columnwise mean is subtracted from the feature
values. Such a technique can be tailored so as to produce
new, reduced data sets based on a desired number of
dimensions. Given the initially prepared data set, the
feature matrix was reduced to 100 principal components
(dimensions), respectively. Similar to the initial data set,
these reduced data sets were formatted as CSR data sets
and written to compressed files.
For the purpose of training the malware classifiers,
the data sets generated thus far represent the model input
(features). The output, or prediction, of such classifiers
is ultimately the classification label (0-4), a categorical
variable. Such labels were extracted from the initial
JSON file of the training data. Analysis and comparison
of the ML models is based on the results of the models
when trained on both an unperturbed, base data set, and
when trained on data sets containing a perturbed set of

Figure 1. Comparison of the Three Adversarial
Training Data Sets

The validation set was generated by designating 25%
of the base data set, T rinput as a constant, unaltered
data set with the naming convention Vinput . The labels
that correspond to the input were similarly designated as
Vlabel . These data sets served as method of comparing
each classifier training iteration (regardless of input)
against an immutable validation set. The remaining
75% of the base data set was used as the unperturbed
control data set, which is designated as C1,input with the
corresponding set of labels being designated as C1,label .
As the C1,input and C1,label serve as the unperturbed
training set, they act as the control training set to
determine the relative effect of the perturbed training
sets on each malware classifier.
The overall perturbation scheme leveraging a data
poisoning attack model for adversarial training entailed
targeting the two aspects of training data that served as
potential threat vectors for adversaries. In an attempt
to poison the data, an adversary could target either
the input features themselves, or the corresponding
training labels in order to degrade the classification
accuracy. The first set of perturbations on the base
data set aimed to naively emulate the poisoning of
the data inputs (dimensionality reduced features). The
scheme is based on stochastic sampling to apply a
uniform perturbation to a percentage of the features per
input so as to effectively poison the data and alter the
accuracy of a potential classification, without being so
drastic as to easily recognizable. The perturbation is
based on iterating through the base inputs of C1,input
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to randomly perturb 20% of the features per input. The
perturbation of 20% of the data allows for a level of
poisoning that is significant enough so as to disrupt the
integrity of the classifier, while ensuring the perturbation
remains undetectable to human perception. This ensures
our poisoned data abides by the previously defined
adversarial sample principles. Of the values selected,
the perturbation involves multiplying non-zero values by
1.5 and changing zero values to the product of a random
integer between 1 and 10 and 0.1. This stochastically
perturbed data set is designated as C2,input . The set
of corresponding labels, C2,label , is unperturbed and is
equal to C1,input .
The second set of perturbations on the base data
set aimed to naively emulate the poisoning of training
data classification labels. Given the lower volume of
data points in the training labels data set compared to
the training inputs data set, the goal with this scheme
was to more randomly perturb a percentage of the
labels in order to degrade the classification accuracy.
Therefore, this stochastic perturbation scheme was
based on iterating through the base classification labels
of C1,label to randomly perturb 20% of the labels within
the base data set. The values selected were changed
to a random value between 0 and 4, representative
of the different potential malware types. This data
set is designated as C3,label . Meanwhile, the set of
corresponding inputs is unperturbed and is equal to the
inputs in data set C1,input .

2.4.

Model Building

The foundation of this work is the implementation
of the 10 most commonly used ML models for
supervised learning (i.e., classification): random forest,
support vector machine, gradient boosting, logistic
regression, artificial neural network, linear discriminant
analysis, quadratic discriminant analysis, Naı̈ve bayes,
bagging, and decision tree.
It should be noted
that 10 base classification models, as opposed to
more, are used to ensure computational tractability
during experimentation and analysis of the stacking
methodology. All models are implemented using the
Python 3.7 ML library, scikit-learn, or sklearn, which
facilitates simplicity and efficiency in ML for data
mining and analysis. All ML models are implemented
with their respective default parameters in order to not
influence the adversarial training based approach.
The support vector machine classifier calculates a
set of hyperplanes based on the training data, all of
which would potentially classify the inputs. In order
to identify the optimal hyperplane, the classifier then
looks to maximize the functional margin. The margin

ultimately represents the distance between the plane
and any point of either class. Further, as applied
to multi-class classification, the logistic regression
classifier distinguishes between classes. The classifier
essentially follows a multinomial logistic function in
order to model a response variable that describes the
probability prediction of the classification label [24].
The multi-layer perceptron classifier is an
implementation of an artificial neural network. The
artificial neural network consists of hidden layers of
perceptrons. Within each layer, inputs are transformed
based on trained weight summation, or bias. Weights
at each hidden layer are trained using backpropagation,
relying on gradient to minimize a cross-entropy cost
function. The result is ultimately a set of prediction
probability estimates for each input [25].
Linear discriminant analysis (LDA) and quadratic
discriminant analysis (QDA) are based on training
linear and quadratic decision boundaries within each
respective model. Decision boundaries for both models
are generating according to Bayes’ rule, with the
conditional probability being modeled on a Gaussian
distribution. the difference between the two models is
in the assumed covariances of the Gaussian densities
for each class. In LDA, the decision boundaries are
calculated under the assumption that the densities for
each class share the same covariance matrix. In QDA,
there are no assumptions with regard to the covariance
matrix for each density. The result, therefore, is the
possibility for quadratic decision boundaries as opposed
to the strictly linear decision boundaries for LDA [25].
The Naı̈ve bayes classifier is an application of
gaussian Naı̈ve bayes classification. The model is an
inherently a naive classification approach due to its
assumption of conditional independence between pairs
of features for a given input. This particular approach
assumes the value of the likelihood of the features
follows the gaussian distribution in order to calculate its
prediction probabilities [25].
The decision tree classifier is essentially a
non-parametric approach to classification that models
a decision, or classification, as tree-like graphs. The
ultimate classification is based on the linear combination
of explanatory variables for a given input. The model
seeks the shortest sequence of explanatory variables in
order to calculate its prediction [24]. Developing the
model calls for a recursive partitioning of a training
sets with respect to its explanatory variable, so that
inputs with similar features are grouped together. The
recursive partitioning creates the structure of a tree and
facilitates such analysis of the shortest combination of
features that enables a prediction [25].
The random forest classifier expands upon the
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decision tree in that it is an ensemble method consisting
of a series of trees derived from randomized subsets
of the training data. Similar to the base decision tree,
each tree will produce a probabilistic prediction of the
overall classification. This prediction probability is then
averaged across all trees, thus producing an overall
prediction for the given input features [25]. The model
consists of 100 trees derived from the corresponding
number of randomized samples from the training data.
The bagging classifier is another ensemble method
and for this research is implemented using a very
similar approach. The key differences in the random
subset of the training data, features are drawn without
replacement.
In a similar approach, the gradient boosting classifier
is an ensemble method that relies on the use of a series
of decision trees as weak learners. The classifier then
builds a greedy, additive model in which trees are added
so as to minimize loss. The minimization is achieved by
calculating the steepest descent method. The method is
ultimate a numerical approach and involves a calculation
of the gradient of the loss function for the given stage of
the ensemble [25].
Finally, this work utilizes a meta-learning approach
known as stacking to generate the adversarially trained
malware classification model. The linear stacking
method involves designating models to be stacked and
such stack serves as Level 1 of the model. The
“stacking” ensemble method, as depicted in Figure 2,
trains and runs the selected models in order to capture
each model’s respective predictions. The predictions for
each are then compiled to form a new data set in which
the predictions become the features for each input and
correspond to a label in the validation or test set. The
new “stacked” data set is then pushed to Level 2 of the
linear stacking model which consists of a base classifier.
The Level 2 classifier is trained on the new data set
so that it is essentially predicting a label based on the
predictions of the Level 1 classification models [26].

Figure 2. Description of the Data Flow Within the
Linear Stacking Ensemble Method

3.

Results and Discussion

3.1.

Base Model Development and
Deployment

The base models serve as the foundation of this
research, as their performance when trained on C1 ,C2 ,
and C3 , respectively, determines the Level 1 make-up
stacked across the top performing models per data set.
Table 1 lists the accuracy scores of the base models.
Each model was trained on each of the three data sets,
and the accuracy report is based on comparing the model
prediction to the Vlabel set.
Table 1. Accuracy Scores for Base Models for Given
Input Data Sets C1 , C2 , and C3
Base Model Classification Accuracy
Base Classifier
Random Forest
Support Vector Machine
Gradient Boosting
Logistic Regression
Artificial Neural Network
LDA
QDA
Naı̈ve Bayes
Bagging
Decision Tree

C1
0.9294
0.9135
0.9211
0.9007
0.9167
0.8836
0.8050
0.5602
0.9226
0.8919

C2
0.9262
0.9007
0.9175
0.8923
0.9175
0.8820
0.6886
0.4944
0.9215
0.8967

C3
0.8931
0.9103
0.9111
0.8927
0.8927
0.8880
0.5060
0.5817
0.8668
0.8002

Initial analysis of the adversarially trained ML
model accuracy reveals the general trend of data set
C2 , a stochastic perturbation of the features, causing a
slight drop in the overall accuracy of the models and
C3 , a stochastic perturbation of the labels, causing a
more drastic decrease in accuracy. The main take away
from the base model assessment, however, is that given
the respective data poisoning attack model perturbation
schemes, the results in Table 1 provide insight into
the top performing models, and, thus, the models most
likely to improve malware classifier performance in the
subsequent stacked model.
For data set C1 , the random forest classifier is
the best performing model based on its accuracy of
0.9294. It is key to note, however, that while not the
top performing models relative to accuracy, the bagging
and gradient boosting classifiers produce similarly high
accuracies of 0.9226 and 0.9211, respectively. In the
case of the bagging classifier, it appears to be the second
highest performing classifier for both data sets C1 and
C2 , respectively. In both deployments, the model is
outperformed by the random forest classifier. Given that
the random forest classifier is the top performer for data
set C1 , a second iteration of the model should not be
included in the stacked model as doing so would only
add duplicate label predictions from the same source.
Because of this, this research designates the bagging

Page 833

classifier as the top performer for data set C2 . The
bagging classifier’s performance when trained on C1
also adds a degree of relative surety that it is a strong
candidate for inclusion in the stacked model.
Analysis of the gradient boosting classifier
demonstrates that although it is not a top performer for
data set C1 or data set C2 , its accuracy of 0.9111 when
trained on data set C3 is the highest among all of the
base classifiers. It also is key to note that while the data
poisoning attack model perturbation scheme in data
set C3 seems to have had a relatively drastic effect on
the other base models, its effect on the accuracy of the
gradient boosting classifier is relatively minimal.
While the accuracy score served as the primary
performance measure to compare models above, Table 2
highlights other ML performance measures (precision,
recall, F1-score) for each of the 10 base classification
models across the three data sets.
Follow-on
experimentation and analysis of the stacking method
will only display results with accuracy used as the
primary performance measure for comparison.
Table 2. Other Performance Measures for Base
Models for Given Input Data Sets C1 , C2 , and C3
Base Classifier
Random Forest

Support Vector Machine

Gradient Boosting

Logistic Regression

Artificial Neural Network

LDA

QDA

Naı̈ve Bayes

Bagging

Decision Tree

3.2.

Data Set
C1
C2
C3
C1
C2
C3
C1
C2
C3
C1
C2
C3
C1
C2
C3
C1
C2
C3
C1
C2
C3
C1
C2
C3
C1
C2
C3
C1
C2
C3

Precision
0.92
0.94
0.79
0.89
0.90
0.89
0.90
0.91
0.89
0.85
0.89
0.89
0.80
0.83
0.76
0.76
0.77
0.78
0.64
0.58
0.57
0.48
0.49
0.48
0.87
0.91
0.72
0.76
0.78
0.59

Recall
0.77
0.76
0.75
0.72
0.66
0.71
0.74
0.73
0.72
0.70
0.62
0.63
0.82
0.78
0.79
0.72
0.70
0.72
0.84
0.79
0.73
0.58
0.54
0.60
0.77
0.75
0.73
0.77
0.76
0.70

F1-score
0.83
0.83
0.77
0.79
0.73
0.78
0.81
0.79
0.78
0.75
0.70
0.69
0.81
0.80
0.77
0.74
0.73
0.75
0.70
0.61
0.55
0.46
0.43
0.47
0.81
0.81
0.72
0.77
0.77
0.63

Stacked Model Development and
Deployment

The stacked model draws upon these three top
performing models across the three data sets in order
to generate the Level 1 classification. Based on each

classifier’s predicted label for each input, the Level
2 classifier in the stack will predict an overall label
for a given input in the data set. Given the Level
1 stack (generated by the random forest, bagging,
and gradient boosting classifiers) and the original 10
base classification models, the product is ultimately 10
stacked models all based on a constant Level 1 stack.
Similar to the base models, these 10 stacked models
can be trained/evaluated on C1 , C2 , and C3 respectively
in order to compare model accuracy relative to each
perturbation scheme. Table 3 lists the classification
accuracy of each ML model relative to each data set as
a means of comparing model performance.
Ultimately, the key takeaway from the results of
the stacked model is their performance relative to the
Table 1 results. When trained on C1 the random forest
classifier predicts with an accuracy of 0.9294, when
trained on C2 the bagging classifier predicts with an
accuracy of 0.9215, and when trained on C3 the gradient
boosting classifier predicts with an accuracy of 0.9111.
In analyzing the Table 3 results, it is clear that the
stacked models do not outperform the top performing
base model relative to data sets C1 , C2 , and C3 ,
respectively. However, it is key that the stacked models
have only a minimal negative effect on the accuracy of
the classifier. Specifically, the stacked model with a
Level 2 support vector machine classifier achieves an
accuracy of 0.9183, 0.9147, and 0.8900 for data sets C1 ,
C2 , and C3 , respectively.
Table 3. Accuracy for “Best of” Stacked Models for
Given Input Data Sets C1 , C2 , and C3
Stacked Model Classification Accuracy
Level 1 Stack

Random
Forest,
Bagging,
Gradient
Boosting

Level 2 Classifier
Random Forest
Support Vector Machine
Gradient Boosting
Logistic Regression
Artificial Neural Network
LDA
QDA
Naı̈ve Bayes
Bagging
Decision Tree

C1
0.9091
0.9183
0.9099
0.6800
0.9163
0.7041
0.8696
0.9167
0.9111
0.9111

C2
0.9095
0.9147
0.9099
0.8297
0.9115
0.7085
0.8788
0.9135
0.9063
0.9091

C3
0.8768
0.8900
0.8856
0.6826
0.8808
0.6882
0.8589
0.8844
0.8824
0.8864

In an effort to analyze the effects of this adversarial
training based ML approach, this work considers two
models based on a Level 1 stack of all base models
(10 models stacked rather than three) with a Level
2 consisting of the gradient boosting classifier and
the support vector machine classifier, respectively.
In analyzing the classification accuracy of these two
additional stacked models, which is provided in Table
4, it is interesting to note that the classification models
also outperform the stacked models based on only the
top three performing base models. The stack of all 10
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models with the support vector machine as the Level
2 classifier even outperforms the top performing base
models for data sets C2 and C3 .
Table 4. Accuracy for Stack of All Base Models for
Given Input Data Sets C1 , C2 , and C3
Classification Accuracy of a Stack Across All Models
Level 2 Classifier
Gradient Boosting
Support Vector Machine

C1
0.9222
0.9274

C2
0.9222
0.9264

C3
0.9091
0.9179

Given this overall top performing model,
a recommendation for subsequent real-world
implementation is to further expand on this adversarial
training based ML approach with a final ensembling.
Because the stack of all models with the Level 2
support vector machine model produced a classification
based on each of the three data sets, C1 , C2 , and C3 ,
the three models can be linearly combined relative
to their predicted probabilities. Given the three sets
of predicted probabilities per class per input, the
maximum a posterior sum of probability values per
class per input can be used to determine the overall
malware classification per input. Specifically, the result
will be a single set of vectors corresponding to each
input of the base data set. Within each vector, select the
highest value, just as the highest prediction probability
is selected to produce a classification prediction; this
is also known as a soft voting ensemble. The ultimate
result is an accurate malware classification that is
designed using adversarial training to account for the
potential for a base, unperturbed data set, a perturbation
of features, and a perturbation of labels.

4.

Conclusions

This work using a ML approach for malware
classification ultimately called for training and
evaluation of ML models based on adversarial training
(i.e., purposeful perturbation of the training data based
on a data poisoning attack model) as a proactive defense
strategy against evasion attacks. This work looked to
demonstrate that doing so aided in identifying those
base classification models best equipped to consider
varying degrees of data poisoning. Stacking these
models created a classifier that is designed considering
the potential of poisoned training data, all while limiting
that effect of poisoning and aimed to ensure accurate
classification modeling performance.
The results of this work suggest that this
adversarial training based ML approach that leverages
stacking ensures strong classification model accuracy.
Furthermore, by increasing the number of models (from
three to 10) in the Level 1 stack, the stacked model

is better equipped to classify in adversarial conditions
than the base models alone. The trade off, however, is a
slightly diminished classification accuracy in instances
where training data may be unperturbed.
Overall, the Level 1 stack across all 10 classification
models with a Level 2 support vector machine can
be considered the best performing model, as it
outperformed even the base models when considering
adversarial conditions and perturbations within training
data sets. There of course exists even more potential
for this model to be expanded using a final soft
voting ensemble approach designed to account for all
perturbation schemes at once. This implementation
can only further expand the ML approach for malware
classification modeling, making it more apt to handle the
potential for adversarial conditions.

4.1.

Limitations and Future Work

First, the shear size of the data set and the number
of features per input exposed a significant memory
limitation of the machine used for classification model
design and implementation. This memory limitation
drove the need for a high degree of dimensionality
reduction of the initial base data set. The effect was
minimal due to the scope of this work. Future work,
however, may call for analysis of the classification
models on larger, non-dimensionally reduced data sets.
Second, the data poisoning attack model
perturbation schemes used within this adversarial
training based ML approach incorporated relatively
naive perturbations based upon simple stochastic
sampling. Specifically, in a real adversarial attack,
perturbations of the data set could be more intelligently
directed, rather than random in nature. Considering how
robust models are to intelligently chosen perturbations
might provide additional insight and value. Further,
future work should investigate and compare more
advanced adversarial example generation techniques
[8], such as evolutionary computation (genetic
algorithms, particle swarm optimization, etc.), deep
learning (e.g., generative adversarial networks), and
other generative methods.
Third, future work calls for the optimization of the
initial base classification models. Given the objective of
this work, using the “default” status of the models was
sufficient due to the focus on presenting the adversarial
training based ML approach. However, future efforts
should focus on refining the base models prior to
the stacking efforts. In particular, an experimental
design could be used for hyper-parameter tuning and
optimization of each of the malware classifiers. By
optimizing the hyper-parameters of the base models, this
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could prove to improve the classification accuracy of the
final stacked model.
Finally, future work should operationalize the final
soft voting ensemble approach to add the prediction
probabilities of the final stacked model for each data
set. This work provides somewhat of an experimental
foundation, but further research should focus on
practical implementation of the adversarial training
based ML approach for malware classification under
adversarial conditions.
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